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Summary findings
Shah examines the reasons developing countries are  Other lessons from experience:
reexamining the respective roles of the private sector,  *  When there is citizen participation and transparency
civil society, and various levels of government  - and  in decisionmaking, limited budgeting, auditing, and
considering new fiscal arrangements between national  accounting systems at the subnational level should not be
and lower levels of government.  considered a barrier to decentralization. Those technical
Decentralization may be particularly well-suited to  capabilities can be borrowed  from higher levels of
developing countries, where central governments are not  government.
as well developed as in industrial countries - because  *  Indonesia and Pakistan provide good examples of
information  requirements and transaction costs are lower  "assymmetric" decentralization, in which various powers
at lower levels of government and the government can be  can be assigned to different levels of government,
more responsive and accountable to the citizenry.  depending on capacity.
Vital to the success of decentralized decisionmaking,  - The delinking of taxing and spending decisions leads
says Shah, are:  to lack of accountability in the public sector.
* A broad public consensus that decentralization is  * Revenue-sharing (tax by tax) distorts incentives for
appropriate.  efficient tax collection.
*  Civil service reform designed to encourage a service  - Properly structured (simple, transparent,  consistent
orientation, to discourage command-and-control  with objectives) fiscal transfers can improve government
governance and rent-seeking, and to prevent the central  accountability. Fiscal transfers can also be used to
government from have a direct say in the recruitment  encourage competition for the supply of public goods. In
and promotion  of subnational civil servants.  Canada and Chile, for example, Catholic schools
*  Proper monitoring and oversight of governance.  compete with public schools for financing.
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During the past half a  century,  by subscribing  to various variants of central planning
paradigms  of development,  developing  countries,  by and large, followed  a path of centralization
and as a result, thtey  are more centralized  today than industrialized  countries  were in their early
stages of development  (Boadway,  Roberts and Shah, 1994). A number of recent developments,
discussed  below, are prompting  most developing  countries  to re-examine  the respective  roles of
various levels  of government,  the private sector and the civil society  as partners in development.
This rethinking  has caused much heated controversy  and debate in development  policy fora.
Regrettably,  this dlebate  has focused on straw men of "centralization"  Vs "decentralization"  (see
Prud'homme 1995, Tanzi 1996, Sewell, 1996 and McLure, 1995) and ignored  the precepts of
federalism  that appropriate institutions  and mechanisms  must be introduced  in support of the
constitutional  assignment  of responsibilities  in multilevel  or multicentered  governments.  It must be
noted  that contrary  to focus in the above mentioned  debate, the federalism  literature  is concemed
with  seeking  optimal  assignment  of responsibilities  among  different  levels  of government  in support
of good governance  (see Shah, 1994). This paper examines  the reasons for a rekindling  of an
interest  in fiscal rearrangements  in both industrial  and non-industrial  countries. It reflects  upon  the
debate on the "danigers  of decentralization" by providing  an evaluation  of the decentralization
experience  using a systemic  framework.  It draws  general and institutional  lessons  to enhance  the
effectiveness  of decentralization  as a means  to foster listening,  learning  and evaluation  environment
for responsive  and accountable  governance.  An overall  conclusion  of the paper  is that decentralized
fiscal structures are more suitable in  the institutional environment  of  developing countries
especially so if careful attention is paid to the design of institutions vital for the success of.
decentralization  policies such as the rule of law, conflict  resolution  and coordination,  charter of
rights, effective  lirnitations  on the authority of governments  beyond their designated  spheres of
influence,  accountability  and institutional  capacity  for evaluation  at all levels.
2. The Quest for the Right Balance
The reasors for rethinking  fiscal arrangements  are manifold  and the importance  of each
factor is country specific. Nevertheless,  generic catalysts for change include the demise of
communism, desire to  breakaway from the vestiges of  colonialism as  in  Africa, national
1government  failures,  subnational  government  failures, assertion  of basic rights  by the  courts,
globalization of economic activities and the demonstration  effects of the European Union and
Latin America (see Picciotto 1995, Shah, 1995).  The demise of  communism prompted a major
change in government organization and geographical boundaries of some countries especially in
Eastern Europe and former  Soviet Union. These countries sought guidance from the principles
and practices pursued in industrialized countries where federal systems of decision making have
evolved over a long period of time. In Africa, both former French and English colonies inherited
highly centralized  systems  of  governance  geared towards  command  and  control  and  against
responsiveness to public at large.  In most countries, national governments have failed to ensure
regional  equity,  economic  union,  central  bank  independence,  a  stable  macroeconomic
environment  or  local  autonomy.  The  record  of  subnational  governments  is  also  not  very
commendable.  Subnational  governments  have  often  followed  beggar-thy-neighbour  policies,
sought to seek free ridership with no accountability and, in pursuit of narrow self-interest, often
undermined national unity.
The judicial  systems in some countries are also providing stimuli for change by providing
a broader  interpretation of basic  rights and  requiring that national  and subnational  legislation
conform to the basic  rights of citizens. The emergence of a  new "borderless"  world economy
complicates this picture by bringing new challenges to constitutional federalism (see Courchene
1995). These challenges  arise  from the decline  of nation  states  in carrying  out regulation  of
certain economic activities as borders have become more porous and information technology has
weakened  their  ability  to  control  information  flows.  The  European  Union's  policies  and
principles regarding subsidiarity, fiscal harmonization and stabilization  checks  are also having
demonstrable effects on country policies. Similarly the success of decentralization in improving
efficiency and equity of public provision and accountability of the public sector in some Latin
American  countries  especially  Colombia and Chile  has  encouraged other  countries to  have  a
review of own  fiscal arrangements (see  Wiesner, 1994).  Finally,  resurgence of interest  in the
federalism principles and  best practices has served a powerful basis to restructure and re-orient
public sector.
2Special Challenges  Arisingfrnom  Globalization
Globalization of economic activity poses special challenges to constitutional assignment
discussed above. Wlith  globalization,  it is increasingly  becoming  apparent that nation states are
too small to tackle large  things in life and too large to address small things. More simply nation
states are fast loosing control  of some of their areas  of traditional  control and regulation  such as
regulation  of  external  trade,  telecommunications, and  financial  transactions.  National
governments  are experiencing diminished  control  in their ability  to control  the flow of goods and
services, ideas and cultural products. These difficulties are paving way for the emergence of
specialized  institutions  of global  governance  such  as the  World  Trade  Organization,  Global
Environmental  Facility  with  many more  to follow especially  institutions  to regulate information
technology,  satellite communications,  and international  financial  transactions.  Thus nation states
would be confederalizing  in the coming  years and relinquishing  responsibilities  in these areas to
supranational  institutions.
In the emerging borderless world economy, interests of residents as citizens are often at
odds  with their  interests  as consumers.  In securing their  interests as consumers  in the  world
economy, individuals are increasingly seeking localization and regionalization of public decision
making to  better  safeguard  their  interests. With  greater mobility  of capital, and  loosening  of
regulatory  environment  for  foreign  direct  investment,  local  governments  as  providers  of
infrastructure  related  services  would  serve as  more appropriate channels  for  attracting  such
investment than national governments.
With mobility of capital and other inputs, skills rather than  resource endowments  will
determine international competitiveness. Education and training typically however is subnational
government responsibility.  Therefore, there would a need to realign this responsibility  by giving
the  national government a greater role in skills enhancement.  The new economic environment
will also  polarize the distribution  of  income in favor of skilled workers accentuating  income
inequalities  and  pcissibly wiping  out  lower  middle  income  classes.  Since  the  national
governments  may  not  have  the  means  to  deal  with  this  social  policy  fallout,  subnational
governments  working  in tandem with national governments would have to devise strategies  in
dealing with the emerging crisis in social policy.
3International  trade  agreements  typically  embody  social  policy  provisions.  But  social
policy is typically an area of subnational government responsibility. This is an emerging area for
conflict  among  different  levels of government.  To avoid these  conflicts  ,  a  guiding principle
should be that to  the extent these  agreements embody  social  policy provisions  they  must be
subject to ratification by subnational governments as is currently the practice in  Canada.
The informationi revolution is leading to  a decrease  in transaction  costs  and  therefore
lowering of costs to  correct for  information  asymmetries and  of writing  and enforcing  better
contracts (see Eid, 1996). Hart (1995) has argued that in such a world organizational form is of
lesser  consequence and therefore,  as a  consequence, the need  for decentralized  institutions  is
diminished. Globalization of information -- satellite TV, internet, phone and fax -- serve also to
enhance citizens'  awareness of their rights, obligations, options and alternatives.
The overall impact of these influences is to force a rethinking on assignment issues and
to force ajurisdictional  realignment in many countries around the globe. Appendix Tables Al-A3
present a  newer federalism perspective on the assignment of responsibilities and the design of
transfers  by taking into account the considerations noted above.  These tables  show that at the
conceptual level some functions such as regulation of financial transactions, international trade,
global  environment,  international  migration  need  to  be  passed  upwards (centralized)  beyond
nation  states,  some  subnational  functions  such  as  training  should  have  greater  central
government  inputs (centralization) and local functions should be completely decentralized  and
should  involve greater  participation  by the civil  society and  the private  sector.  In developing
countries, rethinking these  arrangements has  led to  gradual  and piecemeal  decentralization  of
responsibilities  for  local  public  services  to  lower  levels  in  a  small  but  growing  number  of
countries. The development and  strengthening of  institutional arrangements for  the success  of
decentralized  policies  has  significantly  lagged behind.  It  is  remarkable  that  with  the  single
exception of Colombia, no other  developing country has paid  any  attention to  developing  the
institutional  capacity  for  evaluation.  Even  strengthening  of  central  and  intermediate  level
functions  required for the success of this  realignment have not always materialized. In fact  in
some countries, decentralization is motivated  by shifting the budget deficit and associated debt
burdens to subnational governments.
Emerging Govervance Structure in the 21st Century
4While  rearrangements  taking  place  in the  world  today  embody  diverse  features  of
supranationialization, centralization, provincialization and localization. Nevertheless, the vision of
a governance  structure that  is slowly taking hold  is the one that indicates a shift from unitary
constutitionial structures in majority of the coultries  to federal or confederal constitutions for a
major part of the world. It implies that we are likely to move from a centralized to a globalized
and localized world. The role of the central governments in such a world would change from that
of a managerial authority to a leadership role in a multi-centred government environment.  The
culture of governance is also slowing changing from a bureaucratic to a participatory  mode of
operation;  from  command  and  control  to  accountability  for  results;  from  being  internally
dependent to being competitive and  innovative; from being closed and.slow  to being open and
quick; and from that of intolerance from risk to allowing freedom to fail or succeed. Financial
crisis around the world are hampering this change and as a result the new vision will take some
time to shape in the 21st century (see Table 1) and in many developing countries this vision may
not actually materialize  due to the  conceptual and practical difficulties  noted in the following
sections.
Table 1: Governance  Structure- 20th Versus  21st Century
20th Century  21st Century
*  Unitary  +  Federal/confederal
*  Centralized  *  Globalized  and localized
+  Center  manages  *  Center  leads
*  Bureaucratic  *  Participatory
v  Command  and control  *  Responsive  and Accountable
*  Internally  dependent  +  Competitive
*  Closed  and slow  +  Open  and quick
+  Intolerance  of risk  +  Freedom  to fail/succeed
53.  Why  the  Road  to  Reform  Remains  a  Field  of  Dreams  in  Developing  Countries?:
Theoretical Considerations
A simple way to see why the public  sector is dysfunctional  and  does not deliver
much  in developing  countries  yet is difficult  to reform,  is to have  a closer look  at public
sector  mission  and values,  its authorizing  environment  and its operational  capacity.
a)  Public sector mission and values. Societal values and norms, e.g., as embodied in the
constitution or in annual budget policy statements, may be useful points of reference for
public sector mandates and the values inheren-t  in these mandates. Unwritten societal norms
that are widely shared or acknowledged should also be taken into consideration.  In
industrialized countries, the mission and values of the public sector are spelled out in terms
of a medium term policy framework. For example, there is a formal requirement in New
Zealand that a policy statement of this type be tabled in the parliament by March 31 (about
2-3 months in advance of the budget statement). Public sector values in developing
countries are rarely addressed. Thlis  is because the orientation of the public sector remains
towards "command and control" rather than to serve the citizenry. For an official trained in
'command and control', the need to develop a code of conduct with a client orientation,
may appear frivolous.
b)  Authorizing environment.  This includes formal (budgetary processes and institutions)
and iniformal  institutions of participation and accountability.  Do these institutions and
processes work as intended in providing an enabling environment for the public sector to
meet its goals? Do various levels of government act in the spirit of the constitution in
exercising their responsibilities? What are the checks and balances against deviant
behavior? Is the independence of the central bank, the judiciary,  and the auditor general
guaranteed?  Is the central bank focused solely on price stability or is it expected to
pursue multiple objectives? Are there formal rules to ensure fiscal discipline? Is the
design of transfers consistent with their objectives? Are there private agencies that rate
various levels of government for their credit worthiness? Is public sector borrowing
subject to financial market discipline? How is government performance measured? Are
output and outcome indicators for public services monitored by any one?  In
industrialized countries, institutional norms are strictly adhered to and there are severe
moral, legal, voter and market sanctions against non-compliance.  In a developing
6country  environment,  non-compliance  is often neither  monitored  nor subject  to any
sanctions.
c)  Operational capacity and constraints. What is authorized is not necessarily what will get
done  as the available  operational  capacity  may not be consistent  with  the task at hand.
Further,  even  the operational  capacity  that is available  may  be circumvented  by the
bureaucratic  culture  or incentives  that reward  command  and control,  and corruption  and
patronage. Some  key questions,  the answers  to which  will  give a better  understanding  of
operational  capacity,  include:  Do the agencies  with responsibility  for various  tasks have  the
capacity  to undertake  them? Do  they  have  the right  skills  mix as well  as the incentive  to do
the right  things and  to do them  correctly?  Is the bureaucratic  culture  consistent  with the
attainment  of societal  objectives?  Are there  binding  contracts  on public  managers  for output
performance?  Does  participation  by civil society  help  alleviate  some  of these  constraints?
To what extent  can these  constraints  be overcome  by government  reorganization  and
reform? Whereas,  in industrial  countries,  answers  to most  of the above  questions  are
expected  to be in the affirmative,  this is not true in the case  of a developing  country.
Figure  1: Public Sector Institutional  Environment
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The challenge  of public sector  reform in any country  is to harmonize  the public sector's
mission  and values,  its authorizing  environment  and its operational  capacity  so that there is a
close, if not perfect,  correspondence  among  these three aspects  of governance  (see Figure 1).
Such a task is daunting  for many  developing  countries  since  they often have lofty  goals, but lack
an authorizing  environment  that is capable  of translating  these  goals into  a policy framework.
7This problem is often compounded further by bureaucratic incentives that make any available
operational capacity to implement such a framework completely dysfunctional.
Table 2 presents  a stylized comparison of  the institutional environment  in a primitive
society, a developing country and an industrialized country. It is interesting to note that while
technical  capacity  in  the  modern  sense  was  non-existent  in  a  traditional  society,  due  to
harmonization of its goals, its authorizing environment and its operational capacity, public sector
outcomes were consistent with member preferences. The cultures  of such societies  more often
than  not  focused  on  accountability for  results.  The system of rewards and  punishment  was
credible and swift and much of the business relations were based on informality and trust.  Thus
while per capita GDP in such societies was quite low, member satisfaction with collective action,
the so called "viagara index" was observed to be high and quite possibly not too far behind the
degree of satisfaction with public sector experienced in today's  industrial societies.
Table 2: Public Sector Institutional Environment-Stylized  Facts
Primitive  society  Developing  country  Industrial  country
Goals  Clear  and realistic  Vague  and grandiose  Clear  and realistic
Authorizing
environment  Strong  Weak  strong
Operational  capacity  Consistent  and functional  Dysfunctional  Consistent  and functional
Evaluation  capacity  Strong  Weak  or extant  Strong
Public  sector  Ouput  Input control,  Input and output
orientation  command,  and control  monitoring
Public  sector  decision  Decentralized  Centralized  Decentralized
making
Private  sector  Informality  and trust  semi-forrnality  but lack  Formal  and legal
environment  of trust  and disregard
for rule of law
Evaluation  culture  Snakes  and ladders  "Gotcha"  Learning  and improving
This contrast with the picture that can be portrayed for a typical  developing country. In
such  a  country,  there  is  discordance  in  the  society's  goals,  authorizing  environment  and
operational  capacity. As  a consequence of this  disharmony,  not much  gets  accomplished  and
citizens expectations  are belied. Lack  of accountability and focus  of the evaluation  culture on
frying a big fish occasionally  but doing nothing with the systemic malaise means that any self-
correcting mechanisms that may exist are blunted. Semi-formality  imposes additional  costs  on
doing business but does not lead to any benefits in business relations due to disrespect for law.
Contracts  may  not  be honoured  and  therefore  carry  little value.  In view  of  this  completely
8dysfunctional  nature of public sector in many developing countries, it is important for these to
leapfrog forward  (or even  backwards)  to  a public sector culture that puts premium  on client
orientation and accountability for results. This is however, unlikely to happen soon for reasons to
be discussed later.
In the following section, we take a look at some of the factors that are at play in impeding
the  progress  of realignment of functions  and  harmonization of public  sector  mission,  values,
authorization environment and operational capacity in developing countries.
4.  Why the Road to Reform Remains a Field of Dreams? Practical Considerations
We  noted  that  fiscal  systems  in  most  developing  countries  require  significant
restructuring. Progress todate on such reforms have been uneven.  A number of factors impede
the progress of reform to varying degrees in various countries.
Political Factors
Political  ownership  is  critical  to the  success  of any  fiscal  rearrangements.  In  Latin
America  and  former  centrally  planned economies,  emergence  of  democratic  governance  and
political freedoms led to heightened interest in improvement of public sector performance  and
decentralization of local public services was seen an important element of  this reform. In Latin
America, disenchantment with military rule and dictatorships of various persuasions has  led to
creation of a political culture that places a premium on decentralized decision making to forestall
a return to the past. In China, decentralization was seen as a means for social cohesion, faster
economic  growth and preservation of  communist party rule.  Politics  blocks  reform  in other
countries. In  Indonesia,  forefathers  of the  constitution  clearly  intended  it to  be a  centralized
unitary country and dictated against establishment of "states within the state". These concerns for
political unity have dominated the design of institutions. Well entrenched roles of military and
civil service in political affairs with a strong belief in command and control from the Center have
sustained centralization of responsibility. Appointment of governors and mayors also strengthens
centralization  ancl limits local autonomy.  In recent  years,  however,  social  development  and
economic prosperity and concerns for improving the delivery of public services are bringing a
degree of accommrodation  for decentralized institutions.
9In Pakistan,  political  instability  and  feudal  interests have  contributed  to  setting  aside
constitutional  dictums  and  introducing a system of centralized governance. Pakistan  has been
under military rule for a major part of its existence and military mind set does not accommodate
decentralized  decision  making.  During the  periods, political  activities  were  permitted,  feudal
influences dominated the political system and these influences favored either a centralization  or
provincialization  of  authority.  This  is  because,  while  Pakistan  has  experienced  heightened
urbanization in recent years with over forty percent of the total population as urbanized, electoral
system still recognizes  1981 basis of population distribution (17% urban) 2. In rural areas of Sind
and Balochistan,  and to a more limited extent in rural areas of Punjab and NWFP  provinces,
feudal  lords  do  not  allow  effective  political  participation.  The  use  of  antiquated  basis  of
population  allows  feudal  lords  to  dominate  politics  at  the  federal  and  provincial  levels.  A
centralized  system allows these  lords to  have greater effective control than  would be possible
under a  decentralized system where the  urban sector would have a more significant voice. To
further entrench feudal  lords, under the leadership of the former Prime Minister Ms. Bhutto  in
1994,  local governments were disbanded in all metropolitan areas and not restored even when in
1996 the Supreme Court of Pakistan found this practice to be in contravention of the law. Grants
to members of national  and provincial legislatures for development  projects as practiced until
1997, may have worked against the development of local governments as these members enjoyed
a greater degree of autonomy in project execution in the absence of a well functioning system of
local government.
Bureaucratic Factors
Many countries  in Africa and Asia share a  common colonial  heritage.  The British
Dutch  and French colonial  systems instituted a system of bureaucratic  control to achieve  with
maximum efficiency colonial objectives of a predatory state. The system created a core of civil
service elite which was highly educated and highly dedicated to serving the colonial rulers. Their
loyalty to  rulers and detachment from the common man was duly rewarded  by allowing them
preferential access to all public services through elite institutions and by ensuring them financial
security through  a system  of cash rewards  and  land grants. Thus  colonized countries  such as
2  The population  census  scheduled  for 199  1  was finally  held in 1998.
10India, Kenya, Pakistan and Indonesia inherited civil service regimes that were lhighly  centralized,
efficient,  accountable,  professional  and  completely  detached  from  local  population.  These
regimes have relmained  resistant to change. For example, after independence, in Indonesia, civil
service over time became an active political partner with military in governing the country. Both
partners  viewed  central  control as  a  key  element  in  holding  this  country  of  14,000 islands
together.  A  centralized  regime  also  was  conducive  to  capturing  rents  from  private  sector
development.  Over time, nevertheless, they  discovered that initial degree of cenitralization was
not sustainable and therefore substantial degree of autonomy to local governments while keeping
a week structure of provincial governmients,  is necessary to improve delivery of local services. A
gradual shift towards local control (localization) is thus seen as posing no threat to national unity
and to the preservation of a command and control oriented bureaucratic regime.
Similarly  in Pakistan,  after independence, the civil  service retained  its "professional"
orientation  for  a  while  benefiting  from an  increasing array of  perks  such as  almost costless
acquisition of prifne real estate, free membership in sports and entertainment complexes financed
by  public funds,  privileged  access  to  elite  educational  institutions  for  children  etc.  Political
purges of the civ:il service  in late sixties and early seventies set the civil service on  a road to
administrative decline (see Haque 1996)3.  With insecurity regarding the lack of tenure, areas of
public intervention expanded beyond limits and perks and bribes mushroomed. Corruption now
enables  officials  to  insure their careers against political risks. Thus  the administrative  system
became highly centralized,  entrenched yet dysfunctional. A  key  feature  of this  system  has a
special  bearing  on  local  governance.  Key positions  on  provincial  (provincial  secretary)  and
district governance (divisional and district commissioners) are held on assignment by officers of
the elite "District Management Group".  While performing these duties at subnational levels, they
remain primarily accountable to the federal government only. This system negates federalism and
re-re-enforces federal control over local decision making. For local governments, an especially
worrisome  aspect of this  system of governance is that  if the  local governments  function well,
district  commissioner's  powers  are  considerably  curtailed.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  local
3 This point  is contested  by a reviewer  who argued,  " I think  the reason  for the demise  of the civil  service
are more  complicated  than portrayed on p.7.  In particular,  while political  interference  (and  the political
purges  late sixties  and early  seventies"  as the paper notes)  was certainly  highly  detrimental,  some of the
changes introduced  underPrime  Minster  Z.A. Bhutto's 1973  reforms  were potentally  good ones  (e.g. lateral
entry) in  and of themselves;  they foundered in  the absence  of action  to address  other  systemic  issues  (e.g.
political  interference)."
IIgovernment  is  not  operative,  the  district  commissioner  becomes  the  sole  discharged  of
legislative, judicial  and executive functions  at the district level. No wonder,  one sees that local
governments are not allowed to succeed in Pakistan (see Shah, 1996)4.
Institutional Factors
Institutional factors  also  impede effective decentralization.  Traditional  institutions  and
mechanism of governance and accountability over time have withered away but these have not
been replaced by newer  institutions. Instead, all pervasive role of the state have retarded critical
look at public policies and institutions. There is almost complete monopoly of the government on
institutions of critical thought  and media in many countries. Any critical review of government
policies and programs invites a government backlash. In Pakistan, rural self government worked
well  in  earlier  days  of  its  independence.  This  system  was  abandoned  in  favor  of  a  more
centralized system which has resulted in denial of access to basic services by  rural population.
While lack  of institutional capacity was cited as a reason for disbandment of the participatory
system, the newer system left a majority of citizens with no voice and participation and no access
to basic public services. Indonesia, on the other hand, is now nurturing self-government in rural
areas through its village development and poor villages grant programs (see Shah, 1996).
Another  important  aspect  of  institutional  factors  is the  citizens'  philosophy  towards
government.  Do people generally (politicians, bureaucrats, public employees generally and the
public/voter) view the public sector as one where one does service for fair compensation or a
position to exploit for personal gain. Various opinion surveys suggest that the prevailing public
perception about the public sector especially in South Asia and Africa tend to support the latter
view and citizens tend to associate public sector with a predatory role.
Contrary to  common  misconceptions  (see  for  example,  Tendler's  characterization  of
Decentralization  and  Participation  paradigm  (D&P)), the  success  of  decentralization  policies
critically require a strong responsive and accountable government at the nationial  level just  as the
success of centralized governance critically depends upon responsive, accountable and competent
field offices of  the central government. This is the least understood "paradox of decentralization
4Local  elections  were  held in 1998.
12(rearrangements,) ".  This suggests that  centralization requires a higher degree of  local (field
office)  institutional capacity and competence and greater sophistication and  integrity of public
information monitoring, finance, accounts and audit systems than required under a decentralized
system. The success  of decentralized  structures on the other hand critically depends  upon the
higher level enabling environment and citizen participation and  less so on the  local institutional
capacity  and  information  network  as  conifirmed by the  Colombian  experience  (see  Fiszbein,
1995).  Local  institutional capacity and information networks are no doubt important  yet these
can be overcome by borrowing such capacity from internal and external sources at least during
the earlier phases of decentralization provided a  supporting higher level enabling environment
prevails.
External Participants
Some external participants may also unwittingly impede development of a decentralized
public sector  in <leveloping coultries.  A multitude of factors contribute to  this  development.
First,  a  centralized  system  lowers transaction  costs  for  external  assistance  and  enlarges  the
comfort zone for external participants in terms of monitoring the utilization of  their funds for
intenided purposes.  Second, some  external  participants  have  concerned  themselves  with  the
revenue performance (so called "resource mobilization") of developing countries. Such concerns
may lead to larger centralized bureaucracies that pay little attention to efficient delivery of public
services. For example in Pakistan, minor improvements in  revenue performance of  governments
5 have in the past been accompanied by ever deteriorating quality and quantity of public services5.
Third, centralized systems are more prone to a  lack of internal policy agenda due to a lack of
citizen participation  and  more dependent  on  external advice  on  policy reform.  Typically this
leads to quick policy fixes with little sustained reform. For example, in Pakistan, while the 1956
Constitution stated achievement of universal literacy as a, goal for the next decade. Forty years
later, there has been  little change in literacy rates. In population planning, with US assistance,
Pakistan established  a goal to reduce population growth rate to 2% by  1975. More than twenty
years later, in 1998, growth rate hovers around 2.7%.  Similarly public deficit reduction has been
an elusive goal for the past several decades. External assistance, contrary to  its intentions, may
This point is not shared  by a reviewer  who argues  that:" Revenue  performance  has  not really improved
significantly  anyway:  so the implication  that  the government  (with support  from external  actors  as implied)
sacrificed  better  service  delivery  to revenue  improvements  is not warranted."
13have helped the country avoid facing difficult choices in reducing public sector interventions in
marketplace. Availability of generous external assistance might have played a part in motivating
the  federal  government  in  assuming  some  provincial  responsibilities  and  the  provincial
governments in overtaking local government mandates.
5.  Making Dreams Come True:  Getting Institutions Right
Adherence to federalism principles or "getting prices right" or even "getting the rules of the
game  right" as discussed earlier is a necessary but not a  sufficient conditions for the success of
decentralized decision making.  Complementary formal and  informal institutions  are needed to
ensure that all players in the game adhere to agreed upon set of ground rules and deviant behavior is
properly dealt with. In the following, we discuss selected aspects of this consideration.
Institutions and Processes of  Intergovernmental Coordination
Federal  countries  require  both  formal  and  informal  institutions  of  intergovernmental
coordination,. In some federal countries,  areas  of potential conflict among  different  levels of
government is minimized through clear separation of national and subnational responsibilities (the
so-called layer-cake model of federalism as practiced in Australia, Canada, India and Pakistan) and
the two levels interact through meetings of officials and ministers (executive federalism) and  in
Australia, India and Pakistan through federal unilateralism. Some countries place a greater premium
on a common response through shared or joint tasks such as Germany, a federal country and the
Republic of South Africa, a pseudo federal country. In these countries, in addition to executive
federalism,  the upper houses of parliament (Bundesrat and the Council of Provinces) play a key
role in intergovernmental coordination. In countries with overlapping responsibilities (the so-called
marble cake model of federalism), such as United States and Brazil, state lobby of Congress and
interstate relations  serve coordinating roles. In China, where  growth concerns have  imposed a
federalism structure on a unitary country, regional communist party bosses! governors exercise a
moderating influence on otherwise monolithic orientation of the State Council.
Constitutional provisions per se can also provide coordinating influences. For example, in
some federal countries, constitutional provisions require that all legislation recognize that ultimate
power rests withi  the people. For example, all legislation in Canada must conform to the Canadian
1  4Charter  of Rights. In Switzerland,  a confederation  by law but a federal country  in practice,  major
legislative  changes  require  approval  by referenda.  In Switzerland,  there is also a strong  tradition  of
coordination  through  consensus  initiatives  by cantons.
Institutional Arrangements  for Fiscal Relations
The structure  of intergovernmental  fiscal  relations,  especially  the system  of grants,  must be
determined  by some body.  There  are five main  alternatives.  The first is for the federal government
alone to decide on it.  This alternative  negates  federalism  and would not be acceptable  in many
countries. The second is to set up a quasi-independent  body, such as a grants commission,  whiose
purpose  is to design and reform  the system as practiced in Australia,  India and the Republic of
South  Africa.  This alternative  is prone to more ideal  solutions  rather  than pragmatic  approaches  and
therefore runs the risk of presenting  complex solutions  and recommendations  that may not be
politically  platable. The third  alternative  is to use federalstate  committees  to negotiate  the terms of
the system as done in Canada. The fourth alternative  is to have a joint intergovernmental  cum
interlegislative  commission  such as the Finance  Commission  in Pakistan  and the fifth alternative  is
to have an intergovernmental  legislative  body such as the upper house  of the German Parliament
(Bundesrat)  as in Germany.  The latter three systems allow for explicit political inputs from the
jurisdictions involved,  and therefore likely to opt for simple and feasible but less than ideal
(compromise)  solutions.
Institutions ofAccountability
Institutions  of accountability  is the key to the success  of decentralized  decision  making.
This entails institLutions  and mechanisms  for citizens  voice  and exit,  norms  and networks  of civic
engagement  ("social  capital"  according  to Putnam,  1994),  social  consensus  (Williamson,  1994  and
Weingast,  1993 ), preservation  instinct  of a "stationary  bandit"  who monopolizes  and rationalizes
theft  in the form of taxes (Olson, 1993),  judicial accountability,  vertical and horizontal
accountability.  The citizen voice and exit require institutions  of democratic participation,  and
accountability prowisions  for elected officials. The origins and success of decentralization programs
in Latin America  is traceable  to the democratic  traditions  that emerged  in the continent  in late 1980s.
In Philippines,  recently  enacted  local  government  legislation  while  empowering  these  governments
have provided  for regular  elections  and recall  of elected  officials  for a breach  of public  trust (see the
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networks of civic engagement were reasonably well developed in pre-colonial traditionalist societies
found in many developing countries such as the Panchayat Raj in Pre-British India, these institutions
withered  away  either  under  the  colonial  rule  or  subsequently under  centralized  bureaucratic
governance structures. The net result has been rise of opportunism and social distrust culminating in
dysfunctional societies when formal institutions of governance failed. The African and the South
Asian development fiascoes share this common underpinning. Societal consensus on economic and
political rights is also conducive to accountability at all levels. According to Weingast (1993), this
consensus need not take any formal expression but would work so long as a majority of people
share a common belief as to the limits of governmental intervention and are willing to police those
limits by withdrawing their support from a government that fails to abide by them (see Weingast,
1993, p.306).  Preservation instincts of a stationary bandit also respect accountability (see Olson,
1993). This is because, the stationary bandit strengthens his grip on power, so long as economic
performance is strong and citizens see their well being improved. This explains partly the success of
the Asian Tigers and the failure of  some South/Southeast  Asian regimes. The latter regimes were
controlled by "roving bandits" whose main aim was to make the  loot to  pad their Swiss bank
accounts and then disappear in a foreign haven.
Judicial  accountability  strengthens  the  credibility  of  public  commitments.  This  is
particularly important for transition economies, where framework laws on property rights, corporate
legal  ownership  and  control,  bankruptcy, and  financial accounting  and  control are  not  fully
developed.  Interestingly enough, judicial  accountability is much more difficult to  enforce  in a
parliamentary democracy than in a democratic system which respects separation of legislative and
executive functions. This is because, under a parliamentary democracy, the executive branch can
override  judicial accountability by amending the legislation - a game played ad infinitum in Pakistan
to undermine a decentralized federal constitution.  Judicial accountability is further compromised
under a British style civil service organization as in India and Pakistan where divisional and district
commissioners  hold  simultaneously executive,  legislative and  judicial  powers.  As  noted  by
Montesquieu (1970), such a situation is ripe for the abuse of powers as " ... When the legislative
and  executive powers  are  united in the same  body  of magistrates,  there  can  be no  liberty;...
Again, there  is no  liberty ,  if the judiciary  power be  not separated  from the  legislative and
executive" (Montesquieu,  1970, p.397).
16Evaluation Capacity
We noted earlier that there is a broad consensus  on principles that should guide the
division  of powers  and partnerships  among  different  governmental  and non-governmental  agents
(see also Tables 1-3). How to adapt these principles to the existing institutional and cultural
context to improve  public sector  performance  should  be an ongoing  concern.  Such improvements
will automatically  evolve over time and would obviate  the need for major painful  realignments  if
learning by doing, evaluation and accountability  for results is embedded in the public sector
organizational  culture. Such a cultural change  can be induced  by building institutional  capacity
for evaluation. Such a capacity is vital for citizen participation  and higher level oversight  - the
two important ingredients for the success of any decentralization  program. To build such a
capacity, it is important  to adopt a simple and reasonably  objective  evaluation  methodology and
then have mechanisms in place for self, higher level and independent  evaluation.  Independent
evaluations  of government  programs may be encouraged  by formal institutions such as fiscal
commissions  or associations  of local governments  as in South Africa, by think tanks, press and
the  informal sector. The evaluation methodology adopted by the  Operations Evaluation
Department of  the World Bank  provides a  good starting point for  such evaluation. In
determining, hovv well a  program is performing, it asks three sets of simple yet powerful
questions  as follows:
(a)  Is the public manager doing the right things?
Relevance: Are  the objectives  he/she  seeks responsive  to the needs of the community,  he is
expected  to serve?
Institutional  Development:  Is  the  initiative  he/she  is  undertaking will  result  in
improvements  in local capacity  to do things better in future?
(b)  Is the public' manager doing things right?
Efficacy:  Are the programs  achieving  agreed  upon objectives?
Efficiency:  Is he/she using resources economically  by forging appropriate partnership
within  and without  the public  sector?
(c)  Will the benefits of interventions be sustained?
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and accountable  governance  can be nurtured.  Thus building institutional  capacity for evaluation
should rank high on the list of priorities  for those interested  in creating governments  that work
and strive for excellence  in serving  their citizens.
It  should be noted that  inspite of the benefits associated with building evaluation
capacity, attention  to development  of such capacity is unlikely  to materialize  without  changes in
the existing incentive  structures. Rationalization  of fiscal transfers to include conditionality  on
standards  of services  and access to such services  will provide  positive  stimulus  for evaluation  at
all levels. Citizen education  as to their rights and obligations  and the role of public sector and
developing independent institutions of  critical thought will  strengthen demand for  such
evaluations. Horizontal information exchanges say through voluntary associations of  local
governments  would also serve to enhance demand  for evaluations  and municipalities  would be
interested  in learning  from experiences  of member  municipalities.
18Traditional  Channels  ofAccountability
The audit, inspection and control functions should be strengthened, since they tend to be
quite weak in transition and developing economies. The auditor-general should be given greater
authority and  autonomy  in exercising his  mandate. At the same time, a  case can be made  for
loosening the constraints of the central planning process in developing countries. Central plans lead
to a centralization of authority, a reduction in flexibility, innovation and autonomy at the local level
and  delays  in  private  sector  activity.  On  a  more  specific point,  as  fiscal  responsibility  is
decentralized to the state and local levels, it would be beneficial to create the institutional capacity
for  iocal borrowing so  that more reliance  is placed on borrowing and less on  capital grants to
finance capital projects. Examples include loan councils or municipal finance corporations.
Oversight  of Local Governments:  Freedom  and Responsibility  within  Boundaries
Monitoring and oversight of  local governments is an area of concern in both federal and
unitary  countries  alike.  For example,  the  Republic  of  South  Africa  Constitution  Act  1996
(Section 139(1) (b)) provides for a disbandment of local government in the event of failure to (i)
"maintain  national  standards  or  meet  minimum  standards  of  service";  (ii)  "prevent  actions
prejudicial to the interests of another municipality or the nation as a whole"; and (iii) "maintain
economic  unity."  It  further  provides  for  withholding  of tax  shares  and  transfers  for  non-
compliance  with  tax  effort  (Section  227(2)).  The  fulfillment  of  constitutional  obligations
regarding these provisions require a significant and superior evaluation capacity at provincial and
national  levels. Evaluative  measures  that  can  assist  in this  oversight  include requirement of
annual commercial  corporate audit  of local governments; fiscal  capacity  measurement using  a
common yardstick i.e. equalization of municipal assessments; greater emphasis on formula grants
over project grants  in provincial-local transfers; greater emphasis on public-private-civil society
partnership in public provision; opinion polls on service standards and citizen satisfaction;  and
performance ratings of local governments based upon outputs, outcomes and citizen satisfaction.
Audit of local governments in industrialized countries at the most fundamental level pays
attention to three elements,  adherenice  to the principle of ultra vires, the procedure  by-law and
fulfillment of funded mandates. The principle of  ultra vires states that  a local government should
do only those things that the statutes say it can do and it may not do anything for which it has n1o
19express authority.  The procedure  by-law requires that all  policies of local council  should be
embodied in by-laws and an auditor should look at the council operations for its conformity with
policies and beyond the system of internal control. Thus a local government audit would involve
the following:
Revenues:  by-laws  for  tax  collection  and  administration;  established  procedures  for
assessments, appeals; budget reports incorporating all revenues, financial reports with necessary
information; observance of legal requirements of statutes.
Expenditures:  By-law  for  policies,  established  procedure  for  purchasing,  tendering,
payments,  inventories etc.; establishment of expenditure limits; financial regulations; observance
of statutes.
Others: legal requirements for borrowing; insurance coverage; unfunded mandates; debt;
deficit; long term budget;  commitments; contingent commitments;  cost controls;  resource use;
staffing.
Services:  quality and quantity and distribution.
6.  Decentralization - Fine in Theory But What Is the Practice?
Some writers have cautioned against a shift in division of powers in favor of subnational
governments  in  a  developing  country  environment  and  have  highlighted  the  "dangers  of
decentralization"  (Prud'homme,  1995, also  see  Tanzi,  1996). These  authors  have  expressed
concerns ranging from macro mismanagement, corruption, red tape, and widening gulf between
rich and  poor persons  regions  under  decentralized fiscal  system.  Sewell  (1996)  and  McLure
(1995) provide  rejoinders to these concerns by marshaling conceptual arguments and anecdotal
evidence in support of their viewpoints. Others (see Tendler, 1997) have argued that much of the
fruits of decentralization can be better achieved by delegation (local government acts on behalf of
the higher level government) or deconcentration (regional offices or autonomous agencies of the
higlher level  governments  are  the  implementing  agencies)  by  enlightened  central  and  state
governments  with strong mistrust  of local governments. Such options  invite less political and
bureaucratic  resistance  and  may  not be  inferior  to  decentralization  options  in terms  of their
outcome. They argue that healthy antagonism between different levels of government and strong
activism by central and state governments improves performance of the public and other support
agencies.
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based  uponI available  empirical  evidence.  In  doing so, we  primarily  focus on  the  quality  of
institutional  environment  for  governance  rather  than  the  policies  themselves.  In  relating
decentralization  to  quality  of  institutional  environment  for  governance,  four  aspects  of
governance quality are stressed: citizen participation, social development, government orientation
and economic management.  These aspects are considered in turn in the following paragraphs.
Citizens Participation
Citizen participation ensures that public goods are consistent with voter preferences and
public sector accountability. Such participation is possible only if political freedom  (voice and
exit) is permitted and political stability prevails. Decentralization strengthens citizen participation
by bringing governments closer to the people they are intended to serve. The USAID assistance
programs has given due recognition to this principle by making decentralization and democratic
governance  a cornerstone  of their policy to  develop  transparent  and  accountable  government
institutions  (see  USAID,  1997).  The  success  of  decentralization  as  a  tool  for  citizen
participation,  however,  critically  depends  upon  a  class-less  society and  the  strength  of  local
government institutions (see also Heymans, 1996). In a feudal structure such as the one prevalent
in rural Sindh province of Pakistan, economic dependency of a landless tenant on the feudal lord
is so strong that  feasible choices as to voting with feet or by ballot do  not exist. Under  such
circumstances, decentralized institutions become captive to the whims of the local elite. In urban
areas of Pakistan, where such economic dependency does not exit, the success of decentralization
is curtailed by lack of sufficient powers and resources and accountability mechanisms at the local
level. Feudal politics and bureaucratic institutions consider implementation of legal provisions on
devolution as a threat to their interests and render any such provisions ineffective. Inspite of these
difficulties, the record of decentralized fiscal systems in promoting citizen participation  is quite
impressive as shown by Huther and Shah (1998) using data for a sample of 80 countries.  They
find  that  political  stability  and  political  freedom  indices and  a  composite  index  on  citizen
participation are positively correlated with the index of fiscal decentralization. This relationship
is statistically significant which suggests that citizen participation and public sector accountability
go hand in hand with decentralized public sector decision making.
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for  decentralization  in  promoting  citizen  participation,  increasing  information  flows  between
governments and citizens, enhancing transparency and accountability, integrating society with the
state  and  reinforcing  and  invigorating  democracy  at  the  national  level  (see  Manor,  1996).
Recognizing this,  India  has recently  amended  its constitution  to  strengthen  local government
institutions  (see Paul, 1996). The same results are reaffirmed by Garman and Haggard  (1995)
based  upon  a  comparative  study of Latin  America. They conclude  that  "greater  the  political
sensitivity of central level politicians to subnational political outcomes, the  more decentralized
the system is likely to be " (p.2).
Table 3:  Correlation of the Decentralization Index with Governance Quality Indicators
(sample  size: 80 countries)
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Citizen Participation
Political Freedom  0.599**
Political Stability  0.604**
Government Orientation
Judicial Efficiency  0.544**
Bureaucratic Efficiency  0.540**
Absence of Corruption  0.532**
Social Development
Human Development Index  0.369*
Egalitarianism in Income  0.373*
Distribution
(inverse of Gini coefficient)
Economic Management
Central Bank Independence  0.327*
Debt Management Discipline  0.263
(Inverse of Debt to GDP Ratio)
Openness of the Economy (Outward  0.523**
Orientation)
Governance Quality Index  0.617**
* significant at the 0.05% level (2-tailed test)
** significant at the 0.01% level (2-tailed test)
Source: Huther and Shah (1998)
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Public sector orientation  plays an  important role in public  sector performance.  If the
public service is oriented towards serving its citizens, bureaucratic red tape and corruption would
be minimal and judiciary will further enforce accountability though timely and fair decisions  in
the administration of justice.  One finds such an orientation typically lacking in some developing
countries where the civil service pursues rent seeking and power and influence through command
and control and bureaucratic red tape and graft.
A composite  ranking of countries of three indicators of government orientation, judicial
efficiency, bureaucratic efficiency, and the lack of corruption, provides a good indicator of public
sector orientation and performance.  We relate the degree of expenditure decentralization to the
ranking of countries on individual  indicators as well as to  the composite rank on  government
orientation  and find that  all of these correlations  show a  positive, and  statistically significant,
association  (see  Table  3  ).  This  suggests  that  typically  decentralized  countries  are  more
responsive to citizen preferences in service delivery and strive harder to serve their people than
centralized countries.
Severall  case  studies  corroborate  above  findings.  Crook  and  Manor  (1994),
Meenakshisunclaram (1996) based upon a review of experience of the Indian state of Karnatka,
and Blair (1996) based upon Philippines'  more recent experience with decentralization, conclude
that  decentralized  democratic  governance had  a  positive  impact on the  quality of governance
especially in re-orienting government from a command and control to a service provider role (see
also Blair and  Hlansen, 1994).  Landon (1996) carried out a study of education costs in Canada
and concluded that local control regimes were more successful in controlling overhead costs than
provincial  control  regimes.  Teacher  salaries,  on  the  other  hand,  were  better  controlled  by
provincial  systems.  Humplick  and  Moini-Araghi  (1996)  report  that  for  a  large  sample  of
countries decentralization leads to lower unit administration costs for road services.
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Two  aspects  of social  development  are  considered:  human  development  and  income
inequality.  For ranking countries  in terms of their achievements  on human development,  we
solely rely on the United Nations'  index on  human development. This  index incorporates life
expectancy,  adult  literacy,  educational enrollments  and  per  capita GDP  in purchasing  power
parity  terms.  Egalitarian  nature  of the  society  is captured  by  an  inverse  rank  on  the  Gini
coefficients estimated by Deininger and Squire (1996).  Table 3 shows that fiscal decentralization
is positively correlated and statistically significant with both the indices.
Institutional Environmentfor  Macroeconomic Management
It is frequently argued that a decentralized public policy environment of the type found in
developing countries contributes "to the aggravation of macroeconomic problems" (Tanzi, 1996,
p.305).  In  the  following,  we  reflect  upon  the  available  empirical  evidence  on  aspects  of
institutional framework for monetary and fiscal policies to form a perspective on this issue.
Institutional Settingfor  Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is clearly a central function and best entrusted to an independent central
bank (Shah,  1994, p. 1 1). The critical question then  is whether or not  independence of central
bank is compromised under a decentralized fiscal system.  One would expect, a priori, that the
central bank would have greater independence under a decentralized system since such a system
would  require clarification  of rules under which  a central  bank operates,  its functions  and  its
relationships  with  various  governments.  For  example,  when  Brazil  in  1988  introduced  a
decentralized federal constitution, it significantly enhanced the independence of the central bank
(Bomfim and Shah, 1994). On the other hand, in centralized countries the role of the central bank
is typically shaped and influenced by the Ministry of Finance.  In an extreme case, the functions
of the central bank of the U.K., the Bank of England, are not defined by law but have developed
over time by a tradition fostered by the U.K. Treasury.
For  a  systematic  examination  of  this  question,  we  relate  the  evidence  presented  in
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) on central bank independence for 80 countries to indices
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positive  association  confirming  our  a  priori  judgment  that  central  bank  independence  is
strengthened under  decentralized  systems.  Increases  in monetary base caused  by the  Central
Bank's  bailout of failing state and non-state Banks represents an important source of monetary
stability  and a significant obstacle  to macro economic management.  In Pakistan,  a centralized
federation,  both the  central and  provincial governments  have,  in the  past, raided  nationalized
banks.  In  Brazil,  a  decentralized  federation,  state  banks  have  made  loans  to  their  own
governments without due regard for their profitability and risks causing the so called $90 billion
state debt crisis in 1995.  Thus a central bank role in ensuring arms length transactions between
governments and the banking sector would enhance monetary stability regardless of the degree of
centralization.
Available  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  such  arm  length  transactions  are  more
difficult  to  achieve  in  countries  with  a  centralized  structure  of  governance  than  under
decentralized structure with a  larger set of players.  This  is because a  decentralized structure
requires greate]r clarity in the roles of various public players, including the central  bank.  No
wonder  one finds that the top three most widely acknowledged independent central banks (Swiss
Central Bank, B3undes  Bank of Germany and the United States Federal Reserve Board)  have all
been the products of highly decentralized fiscal structures.
Fiscal Policy
In a  centralized  country, central  government assumes the  exclusive  responsibility  for
fiscal  policy. In decentralized  countries,  fiscal  policy becomes  a  responsibility  shared  by  all
levels of government and the federal (central) government in these countries use their powers of
the purse (transfers) and moral suasion through joint meetings to induce a coordinated  approach.
Several writers (Tanzi,  1995, Wonnacott,  1972) have argued, without empirical  corroboration,
that the financing  of subnational  governments is likely to be a source of concern  within open
federal systems since subnational governments may circumvent federal fiscal policy objectives.
Tanzi  (1995)  is also  concerned with  deficit creation and  debt  management policies  of junior
governments. Available theoretical and empirical work does not provide support for the validity
of these concerns.  On the first point, at a theoretical level, Sheikh and Winer (1977) demonstrate
that relatively extreme and unrealistic assumptions about discretionary non-cooperation by junior
25jurisdictions  are needed to conclude that stabilization by the central authorities would not work at
all  simply because of this lack of cooperation.  These untenable assumptions include regionally
symmetric  shocks, closed economy, segmented capital markets, lack  of supply  side-effects of
local fiscal policy, non-availability of built-in stabilizers in the tax-transfer systems at subnational
levels  and in interregional trade, unconstrained and undisciplined local borrowing and extremely
non-cooperative  collusive  behavior  by  subnational  governments  (see  Spahn,  1997)  . Their
empirical simulations for Canada further  suggest that failure of a federal fiscal  policy  in most
instances cannot be attributed to non-cooperative junior governments'  behavior.  Saknini, James
and  Sheikh  (1996)  further  demonstrate  that,  in  a  decentralized  federation  with  markedly
differentiated  subnational  economies  with  incomplete  markets  and  non-traded  goods,  federal
fiscal policy acts as an insurance against region-specific risks and therefore decentralized fiscal
structures do not compromise any of the goals sought under a centralized fiscal policy.
On  the  potential  for  fiscal  mismanagement  with  decentralization  as  noted  above  by
Tanzi, empirical evidence from a number of countries suggests that, while national/central/federal
fiscal policies typically do not adhere to the European Union (EU) guidelines that deficits should
not exceed 3% of GDP and debt should not exceed 60% of GDP, junior  governments  policies
typically do,  This is true both in decentralized federal countries such as Canada and centralized
federal  countries such as India and  Pakistan.  Centralized unitary countries  even do  worse  on
these indicators. For example, Greece, Turkey and Portugal do not satisfy the EU guidelines. It is
also interesting to note that fiscal stabilization faiJed under centralized structures  in Brazil ands
Argentina but the same countries achieved major successes in this arena later under decentralized
fiscal systems.  The results in Table 3 provide further confirmation of these observations.
Subnational Borrowing
Capital finance needs of developing and transition  countries are currently  estimated at
about $100  billion  a year.  Most of these  investment needs are  for  local public  infrastructure.
Water and sewerage projects account for one-half of these investment needs. Local governments
typically command a lion's  share in public sector investments with a low of 30% in developing
countries  and  70%  in  industrialized  countries.  Therefore,  subnational  credit  market  access
represents a major challenge to finance development needs. In a decentralized fiscal environment,
this challenges poses significant risks for macro stabilization policies of the national government
26as  its  options  for  credit  rationing  and  direct  controls  are  significantly  constrained  by
constitutional division of powers. Instead decentralized fiscal systems rely upon a combination of
credit market discipline, moral suasion and agreed upon rules to  impose financial discipline on
local governments.  Which  system works  better  is  an empirical  question worthy  of  rigorous
research.  The available  evidence  nevertheless poinit to  superior  performance  of decentralized
systems  in restraining  subnational debt.  Central controls as imposed in France,  Spain,  U.K.,
India, Pakistan and Australia (till  1992 under the old Australian Loan Council)  failed to  keep
subnational  debt  in  check  as  intergovernmental  gaming  led  to  weaker  discipline  and  the
possibility of central bailout encouraged less rigorous scrutiny by the financial sector (see Shah,
1997  for  details).  Decentralized  federations  on  the  other  hand,  rely  on  a  combination  of
guidelines,  intergovernmental cooperation and market discipline to keep subnational debt within
sustainable  limits.  They  typically  adopt  a  "golden  rule"  guideline  by  which  subnational
borrowing  is constrained  for  capital  projects  only  or for  short  term  purposes to  smooth  out
revenue inflows and outflows within a single fiscal period. This is the practice in Canada, USA,
Germany and Switzerland. European Union has imposed guidelines on deficit and debt limits as
discussed  earlier  and  has  prohibited  central  banks  from  bailing  out  any  governments.
Intergovernmental cooperation or moral suasion is achieved through executive federalism as in
Canada  or multilateral  information  exchange through the New  Australian  Loan  Council  as in
Australia or through bilateral negotiations as in Denmark. Most importantly the cornerstone of
financial disci6pline  under a decentralized fiscal system is the market discipline enhanced by an
enabling  public policy environment that stresses central bank  independence, disengagement  of
governments from ownership of commercial banks, no bailouts by the central bank or by a highler
level government and requirements for public dissemination of information on public finances.
Some countries such as Switzerland require further that all public borrowing should be subject to
popular  referenda.  State  debt  crisis  in Brazil  should not come  as a  surprise  to  an  informed
observer  as Brazil  opted for  a decentralized  fiscal constitution  but failed to  adopt appropriate
policies to ensure market discipline in such environment as it allowed states to own commercial
banks  and  borrow  from  these  in a  relatively  unconstrained  fashion  while  holding  open  the
possibility of central government bailout in the event of default. Only recently Brazil has moved
to create an enabling framework for credit market discipline for subnational borrowing (see also
Ter-Minasian,  1996).  Recent initiatives to control state/local debt include: sale or rigid controls
over state owned bank; privatization of utilities; downsizing; and restructuring and harmonization
27of the state value added tax (lCMS) to  limit its potential for state industrial policy (see Afonso
and Lobo, 1996).
Outward Orientation
Economic liberalization is now commonly accepted as a cornerstone of good economic
management.  World Bank has recently  ranked countries  on the  openness  of their  economies
taking into account factors such as GNP originating from trade, manufacturing exports,  foreign
direct  investment as a  share of  GDP, commercial  credit  rating and  manufacturing  content  of
exports.  This  index  of  economic  liberalization  is  positively  related  to  the  index  of  fiscal
decentralization.
Institutional Environmentfor  Economic Management
Huther and Shah (1998) combine the three aspects of economic management considered
above  in  a  quality  index  of  economic  management,  the  resulting  index  shows  a  positive
association with the degree of fiscal decentralization.  This is to be expected as the decentralized
systems  are more transparent  in defining the role of various  public agents and  place a  greater
premium on accountability for results.
Quality of Governance and Decentralization
Huther  and  Shah  (1998)  further  combine  indices  on  institutional  environment  for
economic  management, social development, government orientation and citizen participation to
derive an overall index of governance quality. This index is then related to the degree of fiscal
decentralization. Given the positive correlation between all of the governance quality component
indices and the composition of government expenditures, the positive relationship between fiscal
decentralization  and  governance  quality  is to  be expected yet  it is surprising  to  discover the
strength of this positive association (as indicated by correlation coefficient of 0.62) and further
that about 38% of the variance in governance quality is explained by fiscal decentralization alone.
Decentralization and Regional Equity
28While we  have  not addressed the regional  equity issue  due to paucity  of data,  a few
casual observations may be in order. As we noted earlier, regional inequity is an area of concern
for  decentralized  fiscal  systems  and  most  such systems  attempt  to  deal with  it through  the
spending powers of the national government or through fraternal programs. Mature federations
such  as Australia,  Canada  and  Germany  have  formal  equalization  programs.  This  important
feature of decentralization  has not received adequate attention in the design  of institutions  in
developing  countries.  Despite  serious  horizontal  fiscal  imbalances  in  a  large  number  of
developing countries, explicit equalization programs are untried, although equalization objectives
are implicitly attempted  in the general revenue sharing mechanisms used in Brazil, Colombia,
India,  Mexico,  Nigeria  and  Pakistan.  These  mechanisms  typically  combine  diverse  and
conflicting objpctives into the same formula and fall significantly short on individual objectives.
Because these formulas lack explicit equalization standards, they fail to address regional equity
objectives satisfactorily.
Regional inequity concerns are more easily addressed by unitary countries but it is interesting to
note that the record of unitary countries in addressing these inequities is uneven and certainly no
better than federal countries (For evidence on regional income inequalities, Canada: Shah (1996),
China, Tsui  (1996), Indonesia (Shah  and Others,  1994), Brazil (Shah,  1991), Pakistan (Shah,
1995), India (Rao, 1996)) .
Decentralization and the Size of the Government
The public choice  literature in an extreme version, has portrayed the government as a
monolithic entity, "Leviathan" that acts purely in its own interest relatively unconstrained by the
voters.  It is usually thought to be interested in maximizing its own size.  To the extent that this is
true,  it  will  have  consequences  for  the  assignment  of  powers  in  the  sense  that  greater
decentralizationi may reduce the ability of governments to increase their size wastefully.  This is
because both "voting  with feet" and "voting by ballot" constrain the bureaucratic and  political
temptations for empire building. Ehdaie (1994) provides empirical support for this proposition.
He  concludes  that  simultaneous  decentralization  of  the  national  government's  taxing  and
spending powers, by directly linking th-e costs and benefits of public provision, tends to reduce
the  size  of the  public  sector.  Expenditure  decentralization  accompanied  by  revenue  sharing
delinks responsibility and accountability and thereby fails to achieve this result.
297.  Some Lessons for Developing Countries
The following  important lessons for reform of fiscal systems in developing countries can
be distilled from a review of past experiences.
Enabling Environment for  Decentralization i.e. Institutions of Citizen Participation  and
Accountability Must be Addressed  in Any Serious Reform of Fiscal Systems.  Even in primitive
societies such  as pre-British  India, systems of local governance worked  effectively  to  deliver
local  services  and  collect  local  charges  due  to  well  understood  mechanisms  of  citizen
participation and accountability. More modem systems of  local governance such as those run by
elite Pakistani  bureaucrats with training  in management including financial  management have
failed due to a lack of citizen voice and accountability checks. The reform effort must embody
appropriate  provisions  of  recall  of  elected officials  for  negligence  or misconduct.  Fostering
institutions of critical thought and evaluation,  independence of judiciary and  a free media can
play an important part in political and bureaucratic accountability. These elements have not been
sufficiently addressed in most reform efforts.
Societal  norms and consensus on roles  of various levels  of governments  and limits to
their authorities are  vital for  the success  of decentralized decision making.  In the absence  of
such norms and consensus, intergovernmental gaming leads to dysfunctional constitutions.
Civil  Service  Reform  is  Critical  to  the  Success  of  a  Decentralization  Program.
Bureaucratic  ownership  of  a  reform  program  is  critical  but  such  ownership  would  not  be
forthcoming in most developing countries where decentralization is seen as an attempt to weaken
the powers of central bureaucracy. To overcome this, the reform of fiscal systems must embody
reform of central bureaucracies. Such a reform must ensure that the Center has no direct  say in
the  recruitment  and  promotions  of  civil  servants,  other  than  overseeing  thiat standards  of
transparency and fairness are met, at the subnational levels and that remunerations of subnational
services  must  be  competitive  with  the  central  government.  Further,  civil  service  incentive
structure  should  reward  service  orientation  and  performance  and  discourage  command  and
control and rent seeking. This can be accomplished through performance contracts, stay with  it
culture, recognition of specialized  skills and evaluation systems that link performance, rewards
and budgeting.
30Evaluation capacity development is offundamental  importance in public sector reform in
developing  countries.  Formal ex-post  evaluation nurtures  a climate  of listening,  learning and
accountability  in the public sector.  This  is of greater importance in the context of developing
countries where "government failures" have been spectacular but resulted in little afterthought on
appropriateness  of  development objectives  and strategies  as institutions for  accountability  are
weak  or  non-existent.  In  such  an  environment,  evaluation  can  nurture  a  "bottom-line"  or
"developmenit effectiveness  culture"  as Picciotto (1993) has  argued that  "evaluation  is to the
public sector what accounting is to the private sector".  It is interesting to note that the  1996
Constitution of the Republic  of South Africa has  imposed stringent monitoring and evaluation
requirements  on higher  level governments to ensure  proper monitoring  and oversight  of local
governments.
Traditional  administrative  capacity  matters  but  should  not  be  considered  as  an
impediment  to  decentralization.  Administrative  capacity  to  develop  and  maintain  modern
organizational  practices  such  as  budgeting,  auditing  and  accounting  systems  is  no  doubt
important  but  should  not  be  considered  as  a  barrier  to  decentralization  provided  citizen
participation and transparency in decision making is ensured.  This is because technical capacity
cani  be borrowed from supportive higher level governments and elsewhere
Asymmetric  Decentralization  as  provided  under  the  Indonesian  Decentralization
Program  and Uncder  Provincial Local Government Ordinances in Pakistan offers a thoughtful
approach  to  Decentralization.  Regardless  of  the  availability  of  help  from  higher  level
governments,  lack; of  institutional capacity  should never  be  considered  as  an  excuse  not to
decentralize.  Instead, an objective program of decentralization which recognizes the nature and
type of local government, its clientele and its fiscal capacity can be developed and various local
governments  can  be assigned differential  powers by taking  into account the above mentioned
factors as was dore  in Pakistan in the past and more systematically being done in Indonesia  by
rating each local government.
A4  major separation of spending and taxing decisions leads to lack of accountability in the
public sector.  In Mexico, South Africa and Pakistan, federal revenue sharing transfers finance up
to 99% of expenditures in some provinces. This delinking of taxing and spending responsibilities
31have led to accountability  problems  at the provincial  levels. In the event of such de-linking,  role
of conditional (conditional on standards of services and access to such services and not on
expenditures)  block  transfers  and evaluation  is worth examining  to enhance  accountability.
Sharing of revenues on a tax by tax basis distorts incentives  for  efficient tax collection. In
Pakistan  in the past (until 1996),  tax by tax sharing  of income  and sales taxes may have impeded
reform  of trade taxes  which were not shared with  the provinces.
Successful decentralization cannot be achieved in the absence of a well designedcfiscal
transfers  program. The design of these transfers must be simple,  transparent  and consistent  with
their objectives  (see Appendix  Table 3) .Properly  structured  transfers  can enhance  accountability
of the fiscal system  just as general revenue  sharing  has the potential  to undermine  it. Experiences
of Indonesia and Pakistan offer important  insights in grant design. For example, Indonesia's
education and health grants use simple and objectively  quantifiable indicators in allocation of
funds  and conditions  for the continued  eligibility  of these grants emphasize  objective  standards  as
to access to  these services. Indonesian grants for public sector wages on the other hand,
represents  an example of not so thoughtful  design as it introduces  incentives  for higher public
employment at  subnational  levels. Pakistan's  closed-end matching grant  for  resource
mobilization,  similarly rewards relatively richer provinces more for additional tax effort. An
open-ended  precursor  of this grant program  in vogue during 1991-1996  also called into question
the credibility of federal commitment as the federal government was not able to  meet its
commitment  arising  from that grant  program.
The role  of fiscal  transfers in  enhancing  competition for  the supply  of public  goods
should  not be overlooked. For example,  transfers  for basic  health and primary  education  could  be
made available to both public  and not-for-profit  private sector  on equal basis using as criteria, the
demographics  of the population  served, school age population  and student  enrollments  etc. This
would promote  competition  and innovation  as both public and private institutions  would compete
for public  funding. Chile  permits  Catholic  schools  access  to public  education  financing.  Canadian
provinces  allows individual  residents  to choose among  public and private  schools for the receipt
of  their property tax dollars. Such an option has introduced  strong incentives  for public and
private schools to improve  their performances  and be competitive.  Such financing options are
especially  attractive  for providing  greater access  to public services  in rural areas.
32Finally,  contrary  to  a  common  misconception,  a  developing  country  institutional
environment  calls for  a greater degree  of decentralization  than needed for  an  industrialized
country. For an efficient  working of a centralized  bureaucracy,  advanced  information  gathering
and transmittal  networks,  an efficient  and dedicated  civil service,  and well developed  institutions
of citizen participation and accountability  are needed. This is possible in the setting of an
industrialized  country  environment.  A more primitive  public sector  environment  is more suited  to
a decentralized  form of governance.  This is because information  requirements  and transaction
costs are minimized  by moving  the decision  making closer to people  who are affected by those
decisions.  Closeness  also serves to enhance better participation,  preference  matching for public
services,  transparency  and greater  accountability.
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38Annex Table 1 . A Representative Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities
Function  Policy,  standards  &  Provisionl  Productionl  Comments
oversight  administration  Distribution
Interregional  & International  U  U  N,P  Benefits  & costs international  in scope
conflicts  resolution
External  trade  U  U,N,S  P
Telecommunications  U. N  P  P  National  regulation  not feasible
Financial  Transactions  U,N  P  P
Environment  U,N,S,L  U,N,S,L  N,S,L,P  Externalities  of global,  national,  state and local scope.
Foreign  Direct  Investment  N,L  L  P  local infrastructure  is critical
Defense  N  N  N,P  Benefits  & costs  national  in scope
Foreign  Affairs  N  N  N  I'
Monetary  policy,  currency,  U,  ICB  ICB  ICB,  P  Independence  from all levels  essential.  Some  international  role  for  common
banking  discipline
Interstate  commerce  Constitution,  N  N  P  Constitutional  safeguards  important  for factors  and goods  mobility
Immigration  U,N  N  N  U due to forced  exit
Transfer  payments  N  N  N  Redistribution
Criminal  and civil law  N  N  N  Rule  of law, a national  concern
Industrial  policy  N  N  P  To avoid beggar-thy  neighbour  policies
Regulation  N  N,S,L  N,S,L,P  Internal  common  market
Fiscal  Policy  N  N,S,L  N,S,L,P  Coordination  is possible
Natural  Resources  N  N,S,L  N,S,L,P  Promotes  regional  equity  and internal  common  market
Education,  Health  & Social  N,S,L  S,L  S,L,P  Transfers  in  kind
Welfare
Highways  N,S,L  N,S,L  S,L,P  Benefits  and costs  of various  roads  vary in scope.
Parks & Recreation  N,S,L  N,S,L  N,S,L,P  "  "  "
Police  S, L  S,L  S,L  Primarily  local  benefits
Water,  sewer,  refuse,  fire  L  L  L,P
protection
Note: U is supranational  responsibility,  ICB  is independent  central  bank,  N is  national  government,  S is state/provincial  government,  L is local Government  and P is non-
government  sectors/civil  society.
39Annex Table  2:  Conceptual  basis of tax assignment
Determination  of  Collection  and
Types  of Tar  Base  Rate  Administration  Cowmments
Customs  F  F  F  International trade taxes.
Corporate income  F, U  F,U  F,U  Mobile factor, stabilization tool.
Resource taxes
Resource rent (profits/income) tax  F  F  F  Highly unequally distributed tax bases.
Royalties, fees, charges;
severance taxes; production,
output,  and property  taxes  S,L  S,L  S,L  Benefit taxes/charges  for state-local  services.
Conservation charges  S,L  S,L  S,L  To preserve local environment.
Personal income  F  F,S,L  F  Redistributive, mobile factor, stabilization tool.
Wealth taxes (taxes on capital, wealth, wealth
transfers, inheritances, and bequests)  F  F,S  F  Redistributive.
Payroll  F,S  F,S  F,S  Benefit charge, e.g.,  social security coverage.
Multi-stage sales taxes (value-added tax, [VAT])  F  F  F  Border tax adjustments possible under federal
assignment; potential stabilization tool.
Single stage sales taxes (manufacturer/wholesalelretail)
Option A  S  S,L  S,L  Higher compliance cost.
Option B  F  S  F  Harmonized,  lower compliance cost.
"Sin'  taxes
Excises on alcohol and tobacco  F,S  F,S  F,S  Health care a shared responsibility.
Betting, gambling  S,L  S,L  S,L  State and local responsibility.
Lotteries  S,L  S,L  S,L  State and local responsibility.
Race tracks  S,L  S,L  S,L  State and local responsibility.
Taxation of 'Bads"
Carbon  F  F  F  To combat global/national pollution.
BTU taxes  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  Pollution impact may be national,  regional, or  local.
Motor fuels  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  Tolls on federal/provincial/local  roads.
Effluent  charges  F,S,L  F,S,L  FS,L  To deal with interstate,  intermunicipal or local pollution issues.
Congestion tolls  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  Tolls on federal/provincial/local  roads.
Parking fees  L  L  L  To control  local congestion.
Motor vehicles
Registration, transfer taxes, and annual fees  S  S  S  State responsibility.
Driver's  licenses and fees  S  S  S  State responsibility
Business taxes  S  S  S  Benefit tax.
Excises  S,L  S,L  S,L  Residence-based taxes.
Property  S  L  L  Completely immobile factor, benefit tax.
Land  S  L  L  Completely immobile factor,  benefit tax.
Frontage, betterment  S,L  L  L  Cost recovery.
Poll  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  Payment for local services.
User charges  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  Payment for services received.
Note:  U is supranational agency,  F is federal, S is state or province, L is municipal or  local.
Source:  Shah (1994).
40Annex Table 3. Principles and Better Practices in Grant Desigb
Grant Objective  Grant  Design  Better Practices  Practices  to avoid
To bridge  fiscal gap  *  Reassign  responsibilities  Tax abatement  in Canada  and  Deficit grants
*  Tax  abatement  tax base sharing  in Canada,  Tax by tax sharing as in India
*  Tax  base sharing  Brazil  and Pakistan
To reduce regional  fiscal  General  Non-matching  Fiscal  Fiscal  equalization  programs  General  revenue  sharing with
disparities  capacity  equalization  transfers  of Australia,  Canada  and  multiple  factos
Germany
To compensate  for benefit  Open-ended  matching  RSA grant  for teaching
spillovers  transfers  with matching  rate  hospitals
consistent  with spillout  of
benefits
Setting  national  minimum  Conditional  non-matching  Indonesia  roads and primary  conditional  transfers with
standards  block  transfers  with conditions  education  grants  conditions  on spending  alone
on standards  of service  and  Colombia  and Chile education  ad hoc grants
access  transfers
Influencing  local priorities  in  Open-ended  matching  Matching  transfers  for social  ad hoc grants
areas of high national  but low  transfers  (with preferably  assistance  as in Canada
local priority  matching  rate to vary
inversely  with fiscal  capacity)
Stabilization  capital  grants provided  Limit use of capital  grants and  stabilization  grants with no
maintenance  possible  encourage  private sector  future upkeep  requirements
participation  by providing
political  and policy  risk
guarantee
Source: Shah (1994), Boadway, Roberts and Shah (1994)
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